那些令人恼火的讲原则的人，以及他们的遭遇

作者：Raemon 发布时间：2026-04-13T17:35:11.211Z

我现在被两种想法所困扰：

那些试图推动人们坚守原则（无论是既定原则还是新原则）的人，在某种程度上是文明的重要基石。
此外，这些人真的很烦人，而且往往，怎么说呢，有点疯狂。

这两点感觉都相当重要。

我从那些对社会如何将某些不妥之事视为「没问题/还好」而持有某种固执见解（hobbyhorse）的人身上学到了很多。当他们刚开始抱怨时，我会想：「为什么 X 对你来说这么大不了？」几年后，我对此有了更多思考，然后我会想：「好吧，没错，X 确实是个大问题。」

X 的一些例子，包括注意到……

人们随口说他们会去做某些事，然后却没做。
有人开了一个关于做某种不道德事情的玩笑，大家都笑了，似乎没有人真正意识到「但这有点不道德」。
某个社交群体中的人系统性地避而不谈某些事情（比如出于政治原因），这为社区的新成员、甚至老成员都制造了奇怪的盲点。
某人（或某个群体）有一种在某些方面表现得非常轻微的刻薄（dickishness）的模式，其中任何单一实例都不算太糟，所以如果你因为那个实例而指责他们，会显得小题大做。但是，他们做得非常多，这累积成了他们施加的实质性代价（即累积阈值攻击，Sum-threshold attacks）。

社会依赖于规范。必须有人来维护规范。必须有人找出社会目前错误的地方，并推动更好的规范。

但是，告诉一群安于现状的人「嘿，你们现在的行为其实有点糟糕，如果你们做另一件事会好得多」，是非常令人不适的。

所以，大多数人不会这么做。

那些这样做的人，是经过筛选的，他们兼具「冲突倾向性」和「对自己坚持的立场（hill that they are dying on）极度、甚至过度在意」的特质。

存在一个一阶问题，即他们在自己关注的问题上，往往比我或大多数人认为值得忍受的程度更加激进。（即便我已经更新了认知，认为「实际上，那个问题确实很重要，我应该内化那个原则」）。

但我还看到了至少在少数案例中出现的二阶问题，其过程大致如下：

【Alice】决定原则 X 足够重要，值得大动干戈。

人们似乎不理解这个问题。【Alice】进一步解释。有些人可能明白了，但到了下周他们似乎又忘了。其他人仍然不明白。

我之前讨论过的一个问题是规范创新与心理理论（Norm Innovation and Theory of Mind），即【Alice】高估了向他人解释新规范的容易程度，并有点假设她交谈的对象拥有逻辑全知性。

但是，还有另一件事，那就是：人们……一直神秘地无法理解为什么 X 是个大问题。任何特定的例子或许可以用「实际上 X 的原因是一个相当复杂的想法，也许有些人确实不同意」来解释。但是，某些东西在认识论上感觉很滑头。感觉【Bob】、【Charlie】和所有其他人一直……系统性地抓不住重点，避重就轻。

一种解释是：如果【Bob】、【Charlie】和所有人承认 X 重要到需要改变他们的行为，那将是非常不方便的。于是【Bob】和【Charlie】等人最终形成了一种隐性协作来贬低 X 的重要性，有时口头上应付一下，或者寻找理由不去在意。一场微妙的社会战争就此展开。

【Alice】最终开始（正确地）察觉到，人们不仅仅是不明白。他们是在某种程度上系统性地选择相信或说出错误的话或糟糕的论点，以避免必须去明白。

这给【Alice】带来了一种（有时是）正确的预感，即（许多）人在对她进行煤气灯效应（gaslighting）——不仅仅是不同意，而且是以一种看起来像是人们在隐秘串通、扭曲他们共同的现实地图（map of reality）的方式来表示不同意，从而让他们可以忽视【Alice】关于 X 的论点，这方便地让他们不必采纳奇怪的新信念，也不必冒着得罪其他朋友的风险。这让【Alice】觉得她才是那个正在失去现实感的人。

这里的每个人内心都包含着~~两只狼~~多种驱动他们的动机。当我扮演【Bob】的角色时，通常情况是，我既在对 X 是否属实进行某种真诚的调查，同时，我内心的一部分也有动力去做一些让我感到自己很重要、处于掌控地位或其他什么的事情。

社会包含各种各样的人。有些人比其他人更出于好意。有些出于好意的人比其他人更倾向于隐性合谋（implicitly colluding）。有些人则在积极合谋。有时爱丽丝（Alice）指责某人怀有恶意（bad faith），而这实际上是一个误报（false positive），于是那个人对爱丽丝感到愤怒。而有时，那个人确实怀有恶意，甚至可能是故意的，他们也会对爱丽丝感到愤怒，并使用与那个出于好意的人相同的论据。

爱丽丝最终处在一个看起来人们在系统性地试图削弱她的世界中，她开始以更具敌意的方式与世界互动，随后世界也开始以更具敌意的方式回击。

这……可能以爱丽丝变得有点偏执和/或遭受创伤和/或试图更激烈地争辩她的观点而告终。有时这会让爱丽丝变得激进（radicalizes）。

这最终形成了一个反馈循环（feedback loop），在其中……我不知道，我认为用「爱丽丝变得有点疯了」来描述它并不过分。

但是，爱丽丝是对的（至少在最初的大方向上是这样）。

爱丽丝们通常相处起来并不愉快。有时她们最终会变得好斗且倾向于绝对主义（absolutist），我认为这实际上有点糟糕，我最终会避开她们，因为不值得付出打交道的代价，而且她们正在造成附带损害（collateral damage）。

爱丽丝们最初对自己所关注问题的在意程度往往超出了我认为合适的范围。后来，一些（并非全部）爱丽丝最终对此变得绝对主义，当人们向她们的观点靠拢但没有完全采纳她们的思想框架时，她们并不感到满意。

但是，爱丽丝们也是稀有且珍贵的——她们是那些注意到事情不对劲并值得指出来的人，而且她们愿意真正冲破对此的社交尴尬。

（但是，但是，同样地，世界上也存在亚历克斯们（Alexes），他们对自己钟爱的问题并不正确，他们只是有一个其实没什么意义的钟爱问题，而且他们也以同样的方式变得有点疯，但他们在最初并没有一个真正值得倾听的好观点。我不知道，小心点。）

…

这篇短文的结尾并没有让我特别清楚该怎么做。但至少，我认为当你在很大程度上确定爱丽丝的核心想法至少在方向上是正确的时候，对她们表示同情是恰当的。我认为，目前文明的维护和进步的代价，包括拥有一些爱丽丝。^1

…

我希望人们拥有的一个举动是：

首先，培养一种技能，去察觉你何时在政治动机的驱使下（至少部分地）去相信或不相信某件事。察觉你何时在认识论上耍滑头（epistemically slippery）。特别是当这似乎伴随着某人抱怨一些你并不真正理解的事情时。

然后，当你内心意识到你之所以不打算应用原则 X（Principle X），是因为那会非常烦人且不方便时，直接说「是的，我只是不打算应用原则 X，因为它不方便，或者代价太高，或者不值得权衡」，而不是编造原则 X 是错误的理由。

（这确实需要爱丽丝能够大度地接受这一点。弄清楚规范应该是什么有点尴尬，因为，爱丽丝确实认为原则 X 值得为之奋斗，而鲍勃（Bob）说「很好，但不，我不打算那样做」并不能真正解决那个冲突。但是，至少在那段对话中，爱丽丝或许应该接受鲍勃的说法并继续前进，至少如果她看重不被鲍勃微妙地进行煤气灯操纵（gaslit）的话。）

我不确定这是否真的会有所帮助，但感觉这比现状有边际上的改善。

...

我认为大多数爱丽丝会感激的一件事是，有更多的人参与到规范执行（norm enforcing）的项目中来。愿意站出来说「嘿伙计们，这实际上看起来很糟糕」。这分担了负担，让爱丽丝觉得她们不是在孤军奋战对抗世界，而且社会的规范执行也会更加稳健。

这（对爱丽丝来说）在早期阶段最有帮助，因为那时她们不太可能已经积累了一层掩饰/DARVO（Deny, Attack, and Reverse Victim and Offender，即否认、攻击、扭转受害者和加害者角色），从而导致她们在更极端的立场上变本加厉。当我向爱丽丝们表达「我担心你把这件事看得比合适的程度更严重」时，有些人说：「如果我不觉得其他所有人都会把问题 X 归零化处理（round to zero）而不认真对待它，我会冷静得多。」

但与此同时，无论你如何看待爱丽丝目前的模型，你都可以专注于弄清楚什么是真正的「正确」，并为此努力。

Annoyingly Principled People, and what befalls them

Author: Raemon Published: 2026-04-13T17:35:11.211Z

Here are two beliefs that are sort of haunting me right now:

Folk who try to push people to uphold principles (whether established ones or novel ones), are kinda an important bedrock of civilization.
Also, those people are really annoying and often, like, a little bit crazy

And these both feel fairly important.

I've learned a lot from people who have some kind of hobbyhorse about how society is treating something as okay/fine, when it's not okay/fine. When they first started complaining about it, I'd be like "why is X such a big deal to you?". Then a few years later I've thought about it more and I'm like "okay, yep, yes X is a big deal".

Some examples of X, including noticing that…

people are casually saying they will do stuff, and then not doing it.
someone makes a joke about doing something that's kinda immoral, and everyone laughs, and no one seems to quite be registering "but that was kinda immoral."
people in a social group are systematically not saying certain things (say, for political reasons), and this is creating weird blind spots for newcomers to the community and maybe old-timers too.
someone (or a group) has a pattern of being very slightly dickish in some way, where any given instance is not that bad, so if you call them out for that instance, it feels out of proportion. But, they're doing it a lot, which is adding up to a substantial cost they're inflicting.

Society depends on having norms. Someone gotta uphold the norms. Someone gotta figure out where society is currently wrong and push for better norms.

But, it's super uncomfortable to tell a bunch of comfortable people "hey, the behaviors you are currently doing are actually kinda bad, it'd be way better if you did this other thing."

So, most people don't.

The people that do, are people who are selected for a mix of "conflict-prone-ness" and "really really care about the hill that they are dying on, to an excessive degree."

There's a first order problem, where they are kinda more aggro than I/most-people think is worth putting up with about their pet issue. (Even if I've updated that "actually, that issue was quite important, I should internalize that principle").

But there's a second order problem that I've seen in at least a few cases, that goes something like:

Alice decides Principle X is important enough to make a big deal about.

People don't seem to understand the issue. Alice explains it more. Some people maybe get it but then next week they seem to have forgotten. Other people still don't get it.

A problem I've previously talked about is Norm Innovation and Theory of Mind where Alice is overestimating how easy it is to explain a new norm to someone, and kinda assuming logical omniscience of the people she's talking to.

But, there's another thing, which is: people… keep mysteriously not understanding why X is a big deal. Any given instance of it is maybe explained by "actually the reason for X was a fairly complicated idea, and maybe some people legitimately disagree." But, something feels epistemically slippery. It feels like Bob and Charlie and everyone else keep… systematically missing the point, sliding off it.

One explanation is: it would be really inconvenient for Bob and Charlie and everyone to accept that X is important enough to change their behavior around. And Bob and Charlie etc end up sort of implicitly coordinating to downplay X, sometimes while paying lip service to it, or finding excuses not to care. A subtle social war is waged.

And Alice eventually begins to (correctly) pick up on the fact that people aren't merely not getting it. They're sort of systematically choosing to believe or say false things or bad arguments, to avoid having to get it.

This gives Alice the (sometimes) correct sense that (many) people are gaslighting her – not merely disagreeing, but, disagreeing in a way that sure looks like people are implicitly colluding to distort their shared map of reality in a way that lets them ignore Alice's arguments about X, which conveniently lets them not have to adopt weird new beliefs or risk upsetting their other friends. Making Alice feel like she's the one losing her grip on reality.

Each of these people contains ~~two wolves~~ multiple motivations driving them. When I've been Bob, it's often been the case that I both am executing some kind of good faith investigation into whether X is true and also, part of me was motivated to do something that let me feel important / in control or whatever.

Society has a bunch of people in it. Some are more well-meaning than others. Some of the well-meaning people are more implicitly colluding than others. Some of them are actively colluding. Sometimes Alice accuses someone of acting in bad faith and it really is a false positive and then they get mad at Alice. And, sometimes the person is acting in bad faith, maybe even deliberately, and they get mad at Alice too, using the same arguments as the well-meaning person.

Alice ends up in a world where it looks like people are systematically trying to undermine her, and she starts engaging with the world more hostile-y, and then the world starts engaging more hostile-y back.

This… can end with Alice being kinda paranoid and/or traumatized and/or trying to argue her point more intensely. Sometimes this sort of radicalizes Alice.

This ends up in a feedback loop where… idk, I think "Alice has become a little crazy" is not that unreasonable a description about it.

But, Alice was right (at least about the broad points in the beginning).

Alices are often not fun to be around. Sometimes they end up conflict-prone and absolutist in a way that I think is actually kinda bad and I end up avoiding them because it's not worth the cost of dealing with and they are dealing collateral damage.

Alices often start out caring about their issue a bit more than seems appropriate to me. Later, some (not all) Alices end up becoming absolutist about it, not being satisfied when people update towards their view but not completely adopting their frame.

But, Alices are also rare and precious – they are the ones who noticed something was wrong and worth calling out, and, who were willing to actually push past social awkwardness about it.

(But, but, also, the world contains Alexes, who are not right about their pet issue, they just have a pet issue that doesn't really make much sense and they also go kinda crazy in the same way but they didn't actually really have a good point that was worth listening too in the beginning. idk watch out)

…

This essay does not end with me particularly knowing what to do. But, at the very least, I think it's appropriate to at least be sympathetic to Alices, when you're pretty sure their core ideas were at least directionally right. I think the cost of civilizational maintenance and progress, for now, includes having some Alices.[^1]

…

One move I wish people had was:

First, cultivate the skill of noticing when you're (at least partially) politically motivated to believe or disbelieve something. Notice when you are being epistemically slippery. Especially if it seems to come alongside someone complaining about something you don't really understand.

Then, when you notice in your heart that you're not going to apply Principle X because it would be really annoying and inconvenient, just say "Yep, I am just not applying Principle X because it's inconvenient or too costly or not worth the tradeoff", instead of making up reasons that Principle X is wrong.

(This does require Alice to actually accept that graciously. It's a bit awkward figuring out what the norms should be, because, well, Alice in fact does think Principle X is worth fighting for and Bob saying "cool, but no I'm not gonna do that" doesn't really resolve that conflict. But, at least within that conversation, probably Alice should accept it from Bob and move on, at least if she values not getting subtly gaslit by Bob)

I'm not sure if this would actually help, but, it feels like a marginal improvement over the status quo.

...

This is most helpful (to Alice) earlier on, when they are less likely to have accumulated a layer of obfuscation/DARVO that results in them doubling down on a more extreme version of their position. When I've expressed to Alices "I'm worried you're making this a bigger deal than appropriate", some have said: "I would chill out so much if I didn't feel like everyone else was going to round Problem X to zero, and not take it seriously."

But, meanwhile, whatever you think of Alice's current models, you can focus on figuring out whatever is actually Right, and push for that.

[^1]: There are hypothetical ways this could stop being true. But, they are nontrivial.

那些令人恼火的讲原则的人，以及他们的遭遇

Annoyingly Principled People, and what befalls them

我现在被两种想法所困扰：

Here are two beliefs that are sort of haunting me right now:

1. 那些试图推动人们坚守原则（无论是既定原则还是新原则）的人，在某种程度上是文明的重要基石。 2. 此外，这些人真的很烦人，而且往往，怎么说呢，有点疯狂。

1. Folk who try to push people to uphold principles (whether established ones or novel ones), are kinda an important bedrock of civilization. 2. Also, those people are really annoying and often, like, a little bit crazy

这两点感觉都相当重要。

And these both feel fairly important.

我从那些对社会如何将某些不妥之事视为“没问题/还好”而持有某种**固执见解**（hobbyhorse）的人身上学到了很多。当他们刚开始抱怨时，我会想：“为什么 X 对你来说这么大不了？”几年后，我对此有了更多思考，然后我会想：“好吧，没错，X 确实是个大问题。”

I’ve learned a lot from people who have some kind of hobbyhorse about how society is treating something as okay/fine, when it’s not okay/fine. When they first started complaining about it, I’d be like “why is X such a big deal to you?”. Then a few years later I’ve thought about it more and I’m like “okay, yep, yes X is a big deal”.

X 的一些例子，包括注意到……

Some examples of X, including noticing that…

- 人们随口说他们会去做某些事，然后却没做。 - 有人开了一个关于做某种不道德事情的玩笑，大家都笑了，似乎没有人真正意识到“但这有点不道德”。 - 某个社交群体中的人[系统性地避而不谈某些事情](https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/DoPo4PDjgSySquHX8/heads-i-win-tails-never-heard-of-her-or-selective-reporting)（比如出于政治原因），这为社区的新成员、甚至老成员都制造了奇怪的盲点。 - 某人（或某个群体）有一种在某些方面表现得非常轻微的**刻薄**（dickishness）的模式，其中任何单一实例都不算太糟，所以如果你因为那个实例而指责他们，会显得小题大做。但是，他们做得*非常多*，这累积成了[他们施加的实质性代价](https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/R3eDrDoX8LisKgGZe/sum-threshold-attacks)（即**累积阈值攻击**，Sum-threshold attacks）。

- people are casually saying they will do stuff, and then not doing it. - someone makes a joke about doing something that’s kinda immoral, and everyone laughs, and no one seems to quite be registering “but that was kinda immoral.” - people in a social group are [systematically not saying certain things](https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/DoPo4PDjgSySquHX8/heads-i-win-tails-never-heard-of-her-or-selective-reporting) (say, for political reasons), and this is creating weird blind spots for newcomers to the community and maybe old-timers too. - someone (or a group) has a pattern of being very slightly dickish in some way, where any given instance is not that bad, so if you call them out for that instance, it feels out of proportion. But, they’re doing it a *lot,* which is adding up to a [substantial cost they’re inflicting.](https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/R3eDrDoX8LisKgGZe/sum-threshold-attacks)

社会依赖于规范。必须有人来维护规范。必须有人找出社会目前错误的地方，并推动更好的规范。

Society depends on having norms. Someone gotta uphold the norms. Someone gotta figure out where society is currently wrong and push for better norms.

但是，告诉一群安于现状的人“嘿，你们现在的行为其实有点糟糕，如果你们做另一件事会好得多”，是非常令人不适的。

But, it’s super uncomfortable to tell a bunch of comfortable people “hey, the behaviors you are currently doing are actually kinda bad, it’d be way better if you did this other thing.”

所以，大多数人不会这么做。

So, most people don’t.

那些这样做的人，是经过筛选的，他们兼具“冲突倾向性”和“对自己坚持的立场（hill that they are dying on）极度、甚至过度在意”的特质。

The people that do, are people who are selected for a mix of “conflict-prone-ness” and “really really care about the hill that they are dying on, to an excessive degree.”

存在一个一阶问题，即他们在自己关注的问题上，往往比我或大多数人认为值得忍受的程度更加激进。（即便我已经更新了认知，认为“实际上，那个问题确实很重要，我*应该*内化那个原则”）。

There’s a first order problem, where they are kinda more aggro than I/most-people think is worth putting up with about their pet issue. (Even if I’ve updated that “actually, that issue was quite important, I *should* internalize that principle”).

但我还看到了至少在少数案例中出现的二阶问题，其过程大致如下：

But there’s a second order problem that I’ve seen in at least a few cases, that goes something like:

**【Alice】**决定原则 X 足够重要，值得大动干戈。

Alice decides Principle X is important enough to make a big deal about.

人们似乎不理解这个问题。**【Alice】**进一步解释。有些人可能明白了，但到了下周他们似乎又忘了。其他人仍然不明白。

People don’t seem to understand the issue. Alice explains it more. Some people maybe get it but then next week they seem to have forgotten. Other people still don’t get it.

我之前讨论过的一个问题是[**规范创新与心理理论**](https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/vA6xB98jCCX23KzLf/norm-innovation-and-theory-of-mind)（Norm Innovation and Theory of Mind），即**【Alice】**高估了向他人解释新规范的容易程度，并有点假设她交谈的对象拥有逻辑全知性。

A problem I’ve previously talked about is [Norm Innovation and Theory of Mind](https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/vA6xB98jCCX23KzLf/norm-innovation-and-theory-of-mind) where Alice is overestimating how easy it is to explain a new norm to someone, and kinda assuming logical omniscience of the people she’s talking to.

但是，还有另一件事，那就是：人们……一直神秘地无法理解为什么 X 是个大问题。任何特定的例子或许可以用“实际上 X 的原因是一个相当复杂的想法，也许有些人确实不同意”来解释。但是，某些东西在认识论上感觉很滑头。感觉**【Bob】**、**【Charlie】**和所有其他人一直……系统性地抓不住重点，避重就轻。

But, there’s another thing, which is: people… keep mysteriously not understanding why X is a big deal. Any given instance of it is maybe explained by “actually the reason for X was a fairly complicated idea, and maybe some people legitimately disagree.” But, something feels epistemically slippery. It feels like Bob and Charlie and everyone else keep… systematically missing the point, sliding off it.

一种解释是：如果**【Bob】**、**【Charlie】**和所有人承认 X 重要到需要改变他们的行为，那将是非常不方便的。于是**【Bob】**和**【Charlie】**等人最终形成了一种隐性协作来贬低 X 的重要性，有时口头上应付一下，或者寻找理由不去在意。一场微妙的社会战争就此展开。

**【Alice】**最终开始（正确地）察觉到，人们不仅仅是不明白。他们是在某种程度上系统性地选择相信或说出错误的话或糟糕的论点，以避免必须去明白。

And Alice eventually begins to (correctly) pick up on the fact that people aren’t merely not getting it. They're sort of systematically choosing to believe or say false things or bad arguments, to avoid having to get it.

这给**【Alice】**带来了一种（有时是）正确的预感，即（许多）人在对她进行**煤气灯效应**（gaslighting）——不仅仅是不同意，而且是以一种看起来像是人们在隐秘串通、扭曲他们共同的**现实地图**（map of reality）的方式来表示不同意，从而让他们可以忽视**【Alice】**关于 X 的论点，这方便地让他们不必采纳奇怪的新信念，也不必冒着得罪其他朋友的风险。这让**【Alice】**觉得*她*才是那个正在失去现实感的人。

This gives Alice the (sometimes) correct sense that (many) people are gaslighting her – not merely disagreeing, but, disagreeing in a way that sure looks like people are implicitly colluding to distort their shared map of reality in a way that lets them ignore Alice’s arguments about X, which conveniently lets them not have to adopt weird new beliefs or risk upsetting their other friends. Making Alice feel like *she's* the one losing her grip on reality.

这里的每个人内心都包含着~~两只狼~~多种驱动他们的动机。当我扮演**【Bob】**的角色时，通常情况是，我*既*在对 X 是否属实进行某种真诚的调查，*同时*，我内心的一部分也有动力去做一些让我感到自己很重要、处于掌控地位或其他什么的事情。

Each of these people contains ~~two wolves~~ multiple motivations driving them. When I’ve been Bob, it’s often been the case that I *both* am executing some kind of good faith investigation into whether X is true *and also*, part of me was motivated to do something that let me feel important / in control or whatever.

社会包含各种各样的人。有些人比其他人更出于好意。有些出于好意的人比其他人更倾向于**隐性合谋**（implicitly colluding）。有些人则在积极合谋。有时爱丽丝（Alice）指责某人怀有**恶意**（bad faith），而这实际上是一个**误报**（false positive），于是那个人对爱丽丝感到愤怒。而有时，那个人确实怀有恶意，甚至可能是故意的，他们也会对爱丽丝感到愤怒，并使用与那个出于好意的人相同的论据。

爱丽丝最终处在一个看起来人们在系统性地试图削弱她的世界中，她开始以更具敌意的方式与世界互动，随后世界也开始以更具敌意的方式回击。

这……可能以爱丽丝变得有点偏执和/或遭受创伤和/或试图更激烈地争辩她的观点而告终。有时这会让爱丽丝变得**激进**（radicalizes）。

This… can end with Alice being kinda paranoid and/or traumatized and/or trying to argue her point more intensely. Sometimes this sort of radicalizes Alice.

这最终形成了一个反馈循环（feedback loop），在其中……我不知道，我认为用“爱丽丝变得有点疯了”来描述它并不过分。

This ends up in a feedback loop where… idk, I think “Alice has become a little crazy” is not that unreasonable a description about it.

但是，爱丽丝*是*对的（至少在最初的大方向上是这样）。

But, Alice *was* right (at least about the broad points in the beginning).

爱丽丝们通常相处起来并不愉快。有时她们最终会变得好斗且倾向于**绝对主义**（absolutist），我认为这实际上有点糟糕，我最终会避开她们，因为不值得付出打交道的代价，而且她们正在造成**附带损害**（collateral damage）。

Alices are often not fun to be around. Sometimes they end up conflict-prone and absolutist in a way that I think is actually kinda bad and I end up avoiding them because it’s not worth the cost of dealing with and they are dealing collateral damage.

但是，爱丽丝们也是稀有且珍贵的——她们是那些注意到事情不对劲并值得指出来的人，而且她们愿意真正冲破对此的社交尴尬。

But, Alices are also rare and precious – they are the ones who noticed something was wrong and worth calling out, and, who were willing to actually push past social awkwardness about it.

（但是，但是，同样地，世界上也存在亚历克斯们（Alexes），他们对自己钟爱的问题*并不*正确，他们只是有一个其实没什么意义的钟爱问题，而且他们也以同样的方式变得有点疯，但他们在最初并没有一个真正值得倾听的好观点。我不知道，小心点。）

(But, but, also, the world contains Alexes, who are *not* right about their pet issue, they just have a pet issue that doesn’t really make much sense and they also go kinda crazy in the same way but they didn’t actually really have a good point that was worth listening too in the beginning. idk watch out)

…

这篇短文的结尾并没有让我特别清楚该怎么做。但至少，我认为当你在很大程度上确定爱丽丝的核心想法至少在方向上*是*正确的时候，对她们表示同情是恰当的。我认为，目前文明的维护和进步的代价，包括拥有一些爱丽丝。[^1]

This essay does not end with me particularly knowing what to do. But, at the very least, I think it’s appropriate to at least be sympathetic to Alices, when you’re pretty sure their core ideas *were* at least directionally right. I think the cost of civilizational maintenance and progress, for now, includes having some Alices.[^1]

…

我希望人们拥有的一个举动是：

One move I wish people had was:

首先，培养一种技能，去察觉你何时在政治动机的驱使下（至少部分地）去相信或不相信某件事。察觉你何时在**认识论上耍滑头**（epistemically slippery）。特别是当这似乎伴随着某人抱怨一些你并不真正理解的事情时。

First, cultivate the skill of noticing when you’re (at least partially) politically motivated to believe or disbelieve something. Notice when you are being epistemically slippery. Especially if it seems to come alongside someone complaining about something you don’t really understand.

然后，当你内心意识到你之所以不打算应用**原则 X**（Principle X），是因为那会非常烦人且不方便时，直接说“是的，我只是不打算应用原则 X，因为它不方便，或者代价太高，或者不值得权衡”，而不是编造原则 X 是错误的理由。

Then, when you notice in your heart that you’re not going to apply Principle X because it would be really annoying and inconvenient, just say “Yep, I am just not applying Principle X because it’s inconvenient or too costly or not worth the tradeoff”, instead of making up reasons that Principle X is wrong.

（这确实需要爱丽丝能够大度地接受这一点。弄清楚规范应该是什么有点尴尬，因为，爱丽丝确实认为原则 X 值得为之奋斗，而鲍勃（Bob）说“很好，但不，我不打算那样做”并不能真正解决那个冲突。但是，至少在那段对话中，爱丽丝或许应该接受鲍勃的说法并继续前进，至少如果她看重不被鲍勃微妙地进行**煤气灯操纵**（gaslit）的话。）

(This does require Alice to actually accept that graciously. It’s a bit awkward figuring out what the norms should be, because, well, Alice in fact does think Principle X is worth fighting for and Bob saying “cool, but no I’m not gonna do that” doesn’t really resolve that conflict. But, at least within that conversation, probably Alice should accept it from Bob and move on, at least if she values not getting subtly gaslit by Bob)

我不确定这是否真的会有所帮助，但感觉这比现状有边际上的改善。

I’m not sure if this would actually help, but, it feels like a marginal improvement over the status quo.

...

我认为大多数爱丽丝会感激的一件事是，有更多的人参与到**规范执行**（norm enforcing）的项目中来。愿意站出来说“嘿伙计们，这实际上看起来很糟糕”。这分担了负担，让爱丽丝觉得她们不是在孤军奋战对抗世界，而且社会的规范执行也会更加稳健。

A thing that I think most Alices would appreciate, is more people contributing to the norm enforcing project. Being willing to speak up and say "hey guys, this seems bad, actually." It spreads out the burden, makes it so Alice doesn't feel like they are one lone voice against the world, and society's norm enforcement is more robust. This is most helpful (to Alice) earlier on, when they are less likely to have accumulated a layer of obfuscation/DARVO that results in them doubling down on a more extreme version of their position. When I've expressed to Alices "I'm worried you're making this a bigger deal than appropriate", some have said: "I would chill out so much if I didn't feel like everyone else was going to round Problem X to zero, and not take it seriously."

这（对爱丽丝来说）在早期阶段最有帮助，因为那时她们不太可能已经积累了一层**掩饰/DARVO**（Deny, Attack, and Reverse Victim and Offender，即否认、攻击、扭转受害者和加害者角色），从而导致她们在更极端的立场上变本加厉。当我向爱丽丝们表达“我担心你把这件事看得比合适的程度更严重”时，有些人说：“如果我不觉得其他所有人都会把问题 X **归零化处理**（round to zero）而不认真对待它，我会冷静得多。”

But, meanwhile, whatever you think of Alice's current models, you can focus on figuring out whatever is actually Right, and push for that.

但与此同时，无论你如何看待爱丽丝目前的模型，你都可以专注于弄清楚什么是真正的“正确”，并为此努力。

[^1]: There are hypothetical ways this could stop being true. But, they are nontrivial.

[^1]: 存在一些假设性的方式可以让这不再成立。但是，它们并非微不足道。

角色	特征
Alice	对某个真实问题有洞见，原则上是对的，但过程中可能走偏
Alex	有类似的执念，同样会「疯」，但一开始就没有真正的道理

为什么坚持原则的人，最后往往变得「有点疯」？

核心观点

关键论据

独特洞见

行动指南

那些令人恼火的讲原则的人，以及他们的遭遇

Annoyingly Principled People, and what befalls them

那些令人恼火的讲原则的人，以及他们的遭遇

Annoyingly Principled People, and what befalls them

核心矛盾

Alice 是谁

二阶问题：Alice 是怎么变「疯」的

两个容易被混淆的角色

作者没有解法，但有三个建议

本质洞见

具体实战场景